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Captain Edwin Odisho
Triggering Mechanisms as Barriers to 
PM Effectiveness
Disclaimer
- My research, ideas, opinions, and thoughts 
are my own.
- I am not here as a representative of my 
employer or any other entity.
Presentation Objectives
- Describe Pilot Monitoring Barriers
 Flight Deck Automation
 Pilot Flight Control Design
 CRM Breakdowns
- Describe Transition State
 Triggering Mechanisms
 Known hazards transition to risk
Pilot Monitoring Duties                      
• FAA AC-12—71B, SOP’s and PM Duties for 
Flight Deck Crewmembers
– PM Duties
o Monitors flight path and energy state
o Supports PF
o Monitors aircraft state and system status
o Calls out perceived deviations
o Prepared to intervene, if necessary
Barriers to PM Effectiveness                      
– Time Pressure, high workload
– Lack of feedback, lapses in attention span
– Design of SOP
– Pilots’ Inadequate Mental Model of Automation 
Modes
– Training
– Loss of Situational Awareness
State Transition
• Event(s) that changes hazard to a mishap
– Hazard components
o Source-rudimentary element 
o Initiating mechanism-causal factor(s)
• Transforms hazard (latent failure) into a mishap
• Initiating mechanism-causal factor(s)
oHazard target and threat
• Target is the vulnerable entity
• Threat is the level of risk associated with the target (Ericson, 
2005).
The Hazard Triangle
Ericson (2005)
Safety Risk Mitigation
• Job and Task Analysis
• Evaluate Hazard Triangle Components
• Past Events and Lessons Learned
• Review Safety Criteria, Regulatory 
Requirements, and Current Safety 
Practices
• Ericson, C.A. (2005) Hazard analysis techniques for system 
safety. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons.
GAP Analysis
• Actual-Where We are.
• Optimal-Where we want to be.
 Four Gap Types
 Performance Gap
 Perceptual Gap
 Design Gap
 Organizational Gap
System Design
• Components of System Safety 
–Training
–Equipment
–Procedures
Questions?
